Insurance - Insurer liable for excess judgment upon failure to accept reasonable settlement demand in good faith; merits of absolute liability given favorable consideration. Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. (Cal. 1967). by Gray, Laureen J.
INSURANCE--INSURER LIABLE FOR EXCESS JUDGMENT UPON
FAILURE TO ACCEPT REASONABLE SETTLEMENT DEMAND IN
GOOD FAITH; MERITS OF ABSOLUTE LIABILITY GIVEN FAVOR-
ABLE CONSIDERATION. Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. (Cal.
1967).
Defendant, Security Insurance Company, issued a general liability
insurance policy to plaintiff Mrs. Crisci, owner of an apartment build-
ing. Under the terms of the policy, Security was obligated to defend
actions against Mrs. Crisci and authorized to make suitable settlement
up to the $10,000 limit of the policy. A tenant in Mrs. Crisci's apart-
ment building fell through an opening in a staircase and dangled
fifteen feet above the ground. She suffered physical injuries and de-
veloped a severe psychosis. The tenant sued Mrs. Crisci, alleging
negligence in inspecting and maintaining the stairs.
Security, undertaking the defense of the action, hired an experi-
enced attorney. The attorney and the claims manager of the insur-
ance company believed that if the jury did find that the psychosis had
been triggered by the accident, a verdict of at least $100,000 would
result. The injured party found psychiatrists who would testify that
the accident had caused her mental illness, while Security relied on
psychiatrists at the treating hospital who felt that the psychosis was
not related to the accident. All the psychiatrists who agreed to testify
conceded, however, that a sudden fear of falling to one's death could
precipitate a psychosis. Security apparently felt that the psychiatrists,
who planned to testify for the plaintiff, would not be believed, since
they refused to accept any demand of settlement on the mental illness
issue. Although the insured had offered to contribute $2,500, Security
rejected demands of $10,000 and $9,000, offering only $3,000 for the
physical injuries.
The suit resulted in a judgment of $100,000 for the tenant and
$1,000 for the tenant's husband.1 Security paid $10,000, the limits of
the policy, and Mrs. Crisci was obligated to pay the balance. Mrs.
Crisci and the tenants arranged a settlement of $22,000, an interest
in real property, and an assignment of Mrs. Crisci's interest in the
cause of action against Security.2 Mrs. Crisci was left an indigent
1 Diiare v. Cresci, 58 Cal. 2d 292, 373 P.2d 860, 23 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1962).
2 The assignment made by Mrs. Crisci was not an assignment of her cause of action
but of all her right, title and interest in the money collectible under the judgment.
Letter from Marvin E. Lewis, attorney for the plaintiff, to the San Diego Law Review,
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seventy-year-old widow, suffering a decline in physical and mental
health and making several suicide attempts.3
Mrs. Crisci brought this action against Security, alleging breach of
the implied covenant of good faith in refusing to settle. Finding for
the plaintiff the trial court awarded $91,000, the difference between
the policy limits and the earlier judgment, and $25,000 for Mrs.
Crisci's mental suffering.4 The decision was upheld by the District
Court of Appeal and the insurance company appealed to the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, held, affirmed: By failing to accept a settle-
ment demand which was reasonable, the insurance company breached
its duty to act in good faith. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Adv. Cal.
435, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
The usual provision in a liability insurance contract obligates the
insurance company to defend any actions brought against the insured
and provides that the insurance company may make any settlement
which it deems expedient.5 The duty to defend is expressed in the
terms of the contract while the duty to settle is implied.6 This implied
Nov. 13, 1967. See also Brown v. Guar. Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 693-95, 319
P.2d 69, 78-79 (1957) (discusses assignment of cause of action of this nature to
trustee in bankruptcy); Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 661,
328 P.2d 198, 202 (1958) (cause of action assignable whether considered as tort or
contract action).
8 Mrs. Crisci died several days after receiving the award of damages. Letter from
Marvin E. Lewis, attorney for the plaintiff, to the San Diego Law Review, Nov. 13, 1967.
4 The issue of damages for Mrs. Crisci's mental suffering was also considered by
the court. Since the breach of contract also constituted a tort the court relied on the
fundamental principle that a wrongdoer should compensate an injured party for all
damage of which he is the proximate cause. The court found that peace of mind is a
factor considered in purchasing liability insurance. Therefore, damages for mental dis-
tress proximately caused by a wrongful refusal to settle are not improper. Crisd v.
Security Ins. Co., 66 Adv. Cal. 435, 443, 426 P.2d 173, 178, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 19
(1967).
5 Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARv. L. REv.
1136, 1137 & n.1 (1954). The typical insurance policy contains a provision as follows:
As respects the insurance afforded by the other terms of this policy . . . the
company shall:
(a) defend any suit against the insured alleging such injury, sickness,
disease or destruction and seeking damages on account thereof, even if
such suit is groundless, false or fraudulent; but the company may make
such investigation, negotiation and settlement of any claim or suit as it
deems expedient ....
6 E.g., Davy v. Pub. Nat'l Ins. Co., 181 Cal. App. 2d 387, 394, 5 Cal. Rptr. 488,
491-92 (1960).
If not expressed, the obligation to exercise good faith is implied in every such
contract. Where an offer of settlement is the subject under consideration, the
obligation so imposed on the insurer is to exercise good faith in considering
the interest of the insured in settlement. As a consequence, an insurer guilty
of bad faith in refusing to settle a claim within policy limits breaches its con-
tract and is liable for the entire amount of a judgment recovered against its
insured, including any portion in excess of policy limits.
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obligation to settle is derived from the insurer's control over the
litigation and settlement procedure. The obligation is usually held
to arise from the relationship created by the contract rather than from
any express terms of the contract itself. The action for failure to
settle is, therefore, usually in tort.8 The plaintiff, however, does have
an election between theories of recovery, since the action is said to
sound in both tort and contract.'
Most jurisdictions find an obligation to settle; however, there
exists a split of authority concerning the theory upon which liability
is imposed for failure to settle. The majority of courts ° reason that
the insurer should be held to a standard of good faith, thus imposing
liability only upon a showing of bad faith" in the settlement negotia-
tions. As the relationship is said to be similar to that of principal and
agent, or beneficiary and trustee, most courts have based liability on
bad faith rather than negligence.' 2 There exist, however, variations
as to what constitutes bad faith encompassing fraud, intentional dis-
regard of the financial interests of the insured, and something con-
siderably less than intentional disregard of the insured's interests.'8
Another view, held in a minority of jurisdictions, is that liability for
a judgment, which is rendered in excess of the limits of the policy,
should be imposed where the insurer has acted negligently.' 4 Under
7 E.g., Brown v. Guar. Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d at 684, 319 P.2d at 72.
8 Keeton, supra note 4, at 1138-39 & n.5.
9 Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d at 663, 328 P.2d at 203.
1o See generally Brown v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 314 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1963)
(good faith standard controls in New York); Royal Transit, Inc. v. Cent. Surety & Ins.
Corp., 168 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1948) (under Wisconsin law insurer held to standard
of good faith); Murach v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 339 Mass. 184, 158
N.E.2d 338 (1959); Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168 (1955).
11 Slater v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 174 Ohio St. 148, 149, 21 Ohio Op. 2d 420,
421, 187 N.E.2d 45, 46 (1962). "A lack of good faith is the equivalent of bad faith,
and bad faith, although not susceptible of concrete definition, embraces more than bad
judgment or negligence."
12 E.g., Brown v. Guar. Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d at 687, 319 P.2d at 74.
13 See Detenber v. Am. Universal Ins. Co., 372 F.2d 50, 52-53 (6th Cir. 1967)
(bad faith implies conscious doing of wrong); Davy v. Pub. Natl Ins. Co., 181 Cal.
App. 2d at 396, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 492-93 (dishonesty, fraud and concealment are implied
in term bad faith; good faith implies honesty, fair dealing and full revelation);
Cemocky v. Indem. Ins. Co., 69 Ill. App. 2d 196, 203-08, 216 N.E.2d 198, 203-05
(1966) (fraud standard is not required to show bad faith); Cappano v. Phoenix
Assurance Co., 28 App. Div. 2d 639, 640, 280 N.Y.S.2d 695, 697 (1967) (memoran-
dum decision) (charge which defined bad faith as involving intent to harm or deprive
one of his rights and property or intent to injure by a willful refusal to perform an
obligation was prejudicial to insured and negated good faith standard); Hilker v.
W. Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1930), aff'd on rehearing, 204 Wis.
12, 235 N.W. 413 (1931) (bad faith requires less than intentional disregard of the
interests of the insured).
14 See generally Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Robb, 267 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1959);
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the negligence standard, the obligation is not met "when [the in-
surer] fails to exercise that degree of care an ordinary prudent
person would exercise in the management of his own business."'15
Inherent in both standards is the determination by the courts that
equal consideration must be given by the insurer to its own interests
and those of the insured.' 6 When the demand is near the limits of the
policy, the insurer, rather than reaching a settlement, would prefer to
try the case in hopes of escaping all payment. On the other hand, the
policy holder prefers that the insurer accept the settlement demand,
so that he will not be exposed to a judgment in excess of his cover-
age.17 It is the insurance company's conduct, at the time of this con-
flict, that is to be judged by either the negligence or good faith
standard. If the interests of one party were to be deemed paramount,
the use of either standard would in practice be meaningless. The in-
terests of the insured dictate settlement and, if these interests were
primary, the insurer would settle or be liable for failure to do so.
If the interests of the insurer were given paramount consideration, it
would have no legal duty to settle.'
8
The good faith and negligence standards may seem workable in
the abstract but, when applied to an individual fact situation, diffi-
culties are encountered. The presence of bad faith or negligence is a
question of fact;' therefore, the acts for which liability will be im-
posed vary from case to case. For example, a California court, in
Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co.,20 offered a multitude of factors to be
considered in determining whether there had been a breach of the
obligation to exercise good faith:
Douglas v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 81 N.H. 371, 127 A. 708 (1924);
Murray v. Mossman, 56 Wash. 2d 909, 355 P.2d 985 (1960); Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d
168 (1955).
25 Comment, Insurer's Liability for judgments Exceeding Policy Limits, 38 TEXAS
L. REv. 233, 236 & n.18 (1959). Here the commentator discusses interpretations of the
standard. Does it mean what a reasonable insurer would do, what a reasonable insured
would do, or what an objective third party would do? Since a reasonable insurer in all
likelihood would not settle while a reasonable insured would settle, the only workable
standard is what a reasonable objective third party would do. An alternate test is
found in Radio Taxi Ser., Inc. v. Lincoln Mut. Ins. Co., 31 N.J. 299, 312, 157 A.2d
319, 327 (1960). An insurer is liable for the excess judgment if it fails to settle when a
reasonable man with unlimited exposure in the exercise of due care would have settled.
16 See Ivy v. Pac. Auto. Ins. Co., 156 Cal. App. 2d 652, 659, 320 P.2d 140, 146
(1958).
17 60 YALE L.J. 1037, 1038 (1951).
18 Keeton, supra note 4, at 1145-46.
19 Martin v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 228 Cal. App. 2d 178, 182, 39
Cal. Rptr. 342, 345 (1964).
20 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69.
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[T]he strength of the injured claimant's case on the issues of
liability and damages; attempts by the insurer to induce the insured
to contribute to a settlement; failure of the insurer to properly in-
vestigate the circumstances so as to ascertain the evidence against
the insured; the insurer's rejection of advice of its own attorney or
agent; failure of the insurer to inform the insured of a compromise
offer; the amount of financial risk to which each party is exposed in
the event of a refusal to settle; the fault of the insured in inducing
the insurer's rejection of the compromise offer by misleading it as
to the facts; and any other factors tending to establish or negate
bad faith on the part of the insurer.21
The many and varying elements which must be considered have led
several commentators to conclude that a determination of bad faith
is an extremely difficult question for a jury.22 Indeed, the courts
themselves acknowledge the difficulty of applying the test of good
faith, as evidenced in the following excerpt from the opinion in
Radio Taxi Service, Inc. v. Lincoln Mutual Ins. Co.23
Concededly, the administration of the good faith test is not easy for
either party to the insurance contract. Many elements, both objective
and subjective, enter into the fashioning of an honest decision to
proceed to trial. Considerations of experience, expertise and judg-
ment are particularly important and significant.24
The good faith test has been criticized as essentially one which
turns on credibility.25 The jury or judge must determine the issue
primarily on the basis of testimony relating to states of mind and
intent26 rather than to the existence of objective facts. Since these are
subjective elem ents, the issue will be decided in favor of the party
whom the judge or jury believes.
The negligence test has been critized as too severe, the sentiment
being that it would be unjust to hold an insurer liable for a judgment
in excess of the policy limits without requiring a finding of greater
culpability than mere negligence. Courts, which prefer the bad faith
test to the negligence test, believe that often it may be reasonable
21 Id. at 689, 319 P.2d at 75.
22 Appleman, Duty of Liability Insurer to Compromise Litigation, 26 Ky. L.J. 100,
Ill (1938); 48 f.IcH. L. REv. 95, 101 (1949); 18 STAN. L. REv. 475, 481 (1966)
(discusses arguments for and against absolute liability).
23 31 N.J. 299, 157 A.2d 319.
24 Id. at 305, 157 A.2d at 323.
25 18 STAN. L. R v. 475, 481 (1966).
26 Davy v. Pub. Nat1 Ins. Co., 181 Cal. App. 2d at 397, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 493. "A
determination respecting the presence or absence of good faith involves an inquiry
into motive, intent and state of mind."
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conduct to settle rather than chance a jury trial, even in a situation
where there is little likelihood of recovery.
27
Additionally, the use of either good faith or negligence standards
involves inquiry during trial into the determination made in prior
litigation. The amount of the excess judgment in the personal injury
action, while not conclusive, does give rise to an inference that the
amount awarded is the value of the claim.28 In retrospect, it may
appear that the failure to accept the demand within the limits of
the policy was inconsistent with conduct in good faith or with due
care. The impact of this reasoning upon the judge or jury, as well as
the consequent practical difficulty of applying the standards, is not
to be discounted.
In the case under discussion, the court found sufficient evidence to
hold that Security breached its duty to act in good faith since it failed
to discharge the claim in the most reasonable manner.2 9 Therefore, the
judgment for Mrs. Crisci was affirmed. The court applied the test
used in Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co. 0
When there is great risk of a recovery beyond the policy limits so
that the most reasonable manner of disposing of the claim is a
settlement which can be made within those limits, a consideration
in good faith of the insured's interest requires the insurer to settle
the claim.31
The California courts, in applying this test, have added another
dimension to the theories upon which liability is imposed for failure
to settle. California is said to be one of the jurisdictions in which the
good faith approach is used yet, as may be seen from the above
quotation, a determination, as to what constitutes the most reasonable
manner of disposing of the claim, must be made in applying this so-
called good faith standard. Admittedly the distinction between bad
faith and negligence is not always dear ;82 indeed, the California
27 Brown v. Guar. Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d at 688, 319 P.2d at 74; Georgia Cas.
Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 451-52, 46 S.W.2d 777, 779-80 (1932); Best Bldg. Co.
v. Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp., 247 N.Y. 451, 455-56, 160 N.E. 911, 912-13
(1928).
28 Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Adv. Cal. at 442, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr.
at 17.
29 Id. at 442, 426 P.2d at 177-78, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17-18. Among the facts which led
to the finding of breach of duty were the decision to proceed to trial in light of the
prediction of counsel and claims manager and the speculation that the testimony of
only the defense psychiatrists would be believed.
8o 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198.
31 Id. at 659, 328 P.2d at 201.
32 Brown v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 314 F.2d at 677. See also Gaskill v. Pre-
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approach seems to have added to this lack of clarity by mixing the
criteria of good faith and reasonableness. 33 The insurer must settle,
if settlement is the most reasonable manner of dealing with the
claim. The difficulties of applying the good faith and negligence
tests are thus compounded in the approach used by California.
At the urging of amicus curiae, the court does discuss at some
length an alternative to the good faith and negligence tests-
absolute liability for failure to settle--and finds considerable merit in
this approach.
The proposed rule is a simple one to apply and avoids the burdens
of a determination whether a settlement offer within the policy
limits was reasonable. The proposed rule would also eliminate the
danger that an insurer, faced with a settlement offer at or near the
policy limits, will reject it and gamble with the insured's money to
further its own interests....
Finally, and most importantly, there is more than a small amount
of elementary justice in a rule that would require that, in this situa-
tion where the insurer's and insured's interests necessarily conflict,
the insurer which may reap the benefits of its determination not to
settle, should also suffer the detriments of its decision.8 4
The court found the absolute liability approach to be both simple
and just, and a way to resolve the confusion and difficulty which
exists in interpreting and applying the good faith and negligence
approaches. This is essentially a determination that the interests of
the insured are to be given paramount consideration when the in-
terests of the parties conflict.
One might ask why the court, in view of the approval which it
seemingly gives to the rule of absolute liability, did not adopt the
rule. Admittedly, it is a bold step which most commentators feel
should be taken by the legislature or the insurance companies them-
selves rather than by the courts. 5 Notice is given to those who deal in
insurance that the court finds merit in a rule of absolute liability for
failure to settle.
Rather than announcing a new rule, the opinion suggests and
discusses changes in the law. The value of this approach is question-
ferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 251 F. Supp. 66, 67-68 (D. M.D. 1966) (duty to settle
includes elements of both good faith and reasonable care).
38 18 STAN. L. Rav. 475, 476-77 (1966).
84 66 Adv. Cal. at 441-42, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
35 See e.g., Keeton, supra note 4 at 1184; 48 Mcr. L. REv. 95, 102 (1949).
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able, for it leads to difficulty in understanding the law's current
position.
It was not found necessary, in Crisci, to adopt the proposed rule
because the fact situation presented enabled a decision grounded in
precedent. Therefore, possible countervailing considerations to the
adoption of the rule of absolute liability were not discussed. The
court considered only the advantages of absolute liability, avoiding a
discussion of the disadvantages. However, many of the disadvantages
are found in the concepts which have been used to support the appli-
cation of both the good faith and negligence standards.3 6 Since these
concepts have been considered in prior decisions, a reconsideration
of them may not have been an essential prerequisite for the adoption
of an absolute liability rule. If this be the case, the opinion could be
construed to be an approval of absolute liability. On the other hand,
this same failure to consider the disadvantages may be taken as evi-
dence of the court's hesitancy to approve the new rule and of the
uncertainty of its thought in the area.
If the Crisci court believes in the simplicity and justice of absolute
liability, as it seems to, but is cautious about adopting such an un-
tried concept, will a fact situation ever be discovered which cannot be
squeezed into the good faith or negligence tradition? The definitions
of the terms good faith and negligence are not independent of the
fact situations in which they are found to exist. These definitions
may be broadened by the courts to such an extent that absolute liabil-
ity will be the fact, although the terms good faith and negligence will
still be chanted.
LAUREEN J. GRAY
86 E.g., Noshey v. Am. Auto. Ins. Co., 68 F.2d 808, 810 (6th Cir. 1934) (policy
contains no promise, express or implied, that the insurer will settle in any and all
circumstances); Brown v. Guar. Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d at 688-89, 319 P.2d at 75
(liability should require a greater showing of culpability than mere negligence, let
alone imposing absolute liability); Dumas v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 94
N.H. 484, 485, 56 A.2d 57, 59 (1947) (only the obligation to use due care is imposed
by law on those who undertake a service); Radcliffe v. Franklin Nat' Ins. Co., 208
Ore. 1, 298 P.2d 1002 (1956).
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